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also established. The latter in particular provides a reasonable and easily understood foundation 
for simple systems in which the rate of time preference depends on an index of future 
consumption, and provides a counter-argument to well-known criticisms (e.g., Blanchard and 
Fischer (1989) and Barro and Sali-i-Martin (1995)) of Epstein—Uzawa rate of time preference 
functions. All results are obtained in an analytically simple way, using standard techniques. 
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Abstract
This paper constructs a simple optimal monetary growth model in which an
endogenous and variable rate of time preference provides a rational foundation
for a Tobin-eﬀect in a system where otherwise strong neoclassical assumptions
(e.g., perfect foresight, an infinite planning horizon, and continuous market-
clearing) are maintained. Changes in the proportional rate of growth of the
nominal money supply aﬀect both the rate of time preference (ρ) and the equi-
librium capital—labour ratio. The impact eﬀect of a fall in ρ (less impatience),
and the induced capital accumulation that goes with it, drives the result. Proper
transformation rules for two-state variable control problems and curvature and
simulation results for the rate of time preference function are also established.
The latter in particular provides a reasonable and easily understood foundation
for simple systems in which the rate of time preference depends on an index
of future consumption, and provides a counter-argument to well-known criti-
cisms (e.g., Blanchard and Fischer (1989) and Barro and Sali-i-Martin (1995))
of Epstein—Uzawa rate of time preference functions. All results are obtained in
an analytically simple way, using standard techniques.
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1. Introduction
The issue of ‘money neutrality’ in monetary growth models has always attracted
considerable attention. Early attempts, such as Sidrauski (1967a), generated ‘Tobin-
eﬀects’, or super-nonneutrality, where increases in the proportional rate of growth
in the nominal stock of money (θ) result in larger steady-state capital-labour ratios
(k). At the time the intuition seemed clear. In a world with only two assets, if the
monetary authority drives down the rate of return on holding money, i.e., generates
higher steady-state rates of inflation, individuals (with exogenous average propensities
to save) are induced to reallocate their wealth in favor of an asset whose return (at
least partially) oﬀsets the eﬀect of rising prices. In short, they are induced to hold
greater stocks of capital.1
Unfortunately, such a straightforward eﬀect was quickly seen to depend on the
‘descriptive’ or ad hoc nature of the savings function characteristic of a wide class of
Keynesian models. Studies which instead based savings behaviour on explicit neoclas-
sical intertemporal optimization, such as Sidrauski (1967b), recaptured super-neutral
results.2 Again, the intuition seemed clear, and especially so given the structure
of standard optimal control models. In a world with infinitely-lived and optimizing
agents the equilibrium capital stock was easily seen to have modified ‘golden-rule’
properties, clearly independent of the growth rate in the nominal supply of money.
In other words, since a change in (θ) cannot aﬀect either the rates (assumed posi-
tive and constant) of time preference (ρ) or population growth (g), technology alone
determines the steady—state value of k. The presence of a inverse-monotonic func-
tion for the rate of return r(k) and the steady-state condition r(k) = ρ+ g uniquely
determines the value of k regardless of θ.
More recently, a number of papers have generated Tobin-eﬀects within an opti-
mizing framework by analyzing special cases where non-neutrality holds. The finite-
horizon, overlapping generations models of Drazen (1976), Calvo’s (1979) analysis of
money in the production function, Brock’s (1974) endogenous labour supply and Fis-
cher’s (1979b) characterization of out-of-steady state eﬀects are notable examples.3
However, none of these works explicitly addresses the importance of one of the key as-
sumptions that drives super-neutrality in the standard optimizing framework, that of
an exogenous rate of time preference. This paper does so. Following Uzawa (1968), it
employs a variable rate of time preference function to form a connection between the
monetary and real sectors of the economy, providing, so to speak, a ‘rational’ founda-
tion for super-nonneutrality in a world where otherwise strict neoclassical assumptions
(e.g., perfect foresight, an infinite planning horizon, continuous market-clearing) are
maintained.4
1See Tobin (1965) and especially Fischer (1979a) for a complete treatment.
2See Brock (1974), Calvo (1979) and Fischer (1979b) as well.
3There are a class of endogenous monetary growth models that also generate non-neutral out-
comes, where changes in π determine the rate of growth through endogenous productivity eﬀects. De
Gregorio (1993) and Gomme (1993) are good examples. All of this is ignored in the present paper,
of course, since g is exogenous. The idea is to isolate the eﬀects of a variable and endogenous rate
of time preference in the simplest possible setting.
4There is a related point. Generally speaking, deterministic monetary growth models can be
considered as special cases of (stochastic) rational expectations (RE) models with systematic mon-
etary policy. However, rational expectations models are invariably constructed with super-neutral
outcomes. Some time ago, Begg (1980:293), in particular, noted the conflict between (early) growth
models with Tobin-eﬀects and the RE approach, arguing that the “models analyzed in the rational
expectations literature typically impose super-neutrality, whereas the literature on growth models
with money emphasizes a mechanism which necessarily violates the super-neutrality condition.” Nev-
ertheless, Begg makes his case not from an optimizing framework, but with a ‘descriptive’ model
where, as one might expect, non-neutrality depends simply on whether or not real money balances
enter the consumption function as an argument, or whether the demand for money depends on the
nominal rate of interest. Cf. Fischer (1979a) and Gale (1983:84—109).
In this context, the present paper re-aﬃrms Begg’s argument in a system with explicit intertem-
poral optimization. Indeed, in the model below it is easily seen that although steady-state utility
falls with an increase in θ, level utility is still greater than in any comparable RE system which
simply imposes super-neutrality with a constant rate of time preference and, as a result, generates
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In simple terms the argument runs as follows. Standard monetary growth mod-
els employ utility functionals which are additive and discounted by a constant and
positive value for ρ. The marginal rate of substitution between any two time-periods
is thus independent of the utility from consumption at any other point in the time
horizon. Such a structure breaks the link between long-run holdings of per-capita real
money balances and k. Alternatively, by constructing a function for the rate of time
preference so that it depends at each point in time on an index of current and future
utility from consumption and real money balances, a connection between θ and k
can be re-established. Across steady-state comparisons, an increase in θ results in an
increase in the equilibrium capital-labour ratio and a fall in both the rate of return to
capital and the rate of time preference.5 A Tobin-eﬀect is restored, and the impact
eﬀect of a fall in ρ (less impatience), and the induced capital accumulation that goes
with it, drives the result.
This paper has an additional objective, specific to the construction of a wide-
variety of models with variable rates of time preference. With money excluded, the
Uzawa-type functional studied below takes the general form6
J(c) =
] ∞
0
u(c(t)) exp

−
] t
0
ρ(u(c(t))dτ

dt (1.1)
where the rate of time preference (ρ) depends on the utility derived from consumption
(c(t)) along a given path, and where the value
∆(t) =
] t
0
ρ(u(c(t))dτ (1.2)
defines a utility discount factor applied at each time t.
There are two points of concern here. First, including ∆ as an extra state vari-
able clearly complicates the analysis, requiring (along with the usual state-variable
constraint) now four dimensions to qualitatively characterize the four diﬀerential equa-
tions describing the co-state and state variables. To circumvent the problem, Uzawa
(1968:491) also introduced a simple method for reducing the problem (dimensionally)
to a single state variable by transforming the time scale from t to ∆, taking ∆ as the
independent variable and thus treating ρ as constant at each point on a given path.
The problem, however, is that for this transformation to be valid the underlying sys-
tem to be analyzed must be autonomous and except for the simplest control problems
this is rarely the case. Non-autonomous transition equations (such as in the optimal
monetary growth model developed below) imply that the correspondence between ∆
no change in the equilibrium capital-labour ratio.
5Uzawa (1968) and Epstein and Hynes (1983) are two closely related papers, developing similar
systems and results. In a sense, the present paper simply elaborates on these two works. However,
Uzawa’s (1968) monetary growth model uses a transformation rule (as detailed in section 2 below),
which generates considerable errors in first-order conditions and optimal paths, and although the
functional form contained in Epstein and Hynes (1983) is actually less general than that of equation
(1.1) below, the analysis in sections 4—7 on monetary growth is arguably more straightforward and
complete. A good part of the motivation for the present paper is a desire to construct and explicitly
solve an analytically simple model, using only standard techniques familiar to the theory of optimal
monetary growth. Nothing in sections 4—7 below requires a knowledge of Volterra derivatives or the
properties of weakly-separable utility functionals.
6Uzawa (1968) preferences belong to the general class of utility functionals used by Epstein
(1983,1987a,1987b). See Buckholtz and Hartwick (1989), Epstein and Shi (1993), Nairay (1984) and
Uzawa (1969) as well.
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and t is no longer unique and thus Uzawa’s transformation is not applicable. Section 2
of the paper shows this point clearly and indicates the required conditions for proper
transformations of two-state variable problems of this form.7
The issue is doubly important since Uzawa’s transformation has been used exten-
sively in models of international trade and finance (e.g., Obstfeld (1981a,1981b,1982)
and Engel and Kletzer (1989)), where the use of a variable rate of time preference
nicely avoids some of the “disturbing implications” drawn from typical open-economy
Ramsey models.8 However, once again, given the non-autonomous nature of these
systems, such a transformation is improper and as such generates errors in first-order
conditions and resulting optimal paths that are incorrect.
Second, to ensure (saddlepoint) stability of the resulting dynamic system, the
function ρ = ρ(u(c(t)) is usually restricted such that
ρ > 0 ρ3 > 0 ρ33 > 0 ρ− ρ3u > 0 (1.3)
where, to guarantee the existence of an optimal program, requires
(u3)2ρ33(u) + u33ρ3(u) < 0 (1.4)
so that, roughly speaking, the concavity of u(c) oﬀsets the convexity of ρ(u), and
thus ρ˜(c) = ρ[u(c)] is concave.9 However, such restrictions have generated consid-
erable criticism, particularly with regard to ρ3 > 0, and regardless of whether c or
u is the relevant argument in the functional form.10 For example, Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (1995:108—09) argue that ρ as a positive function of consumption (c(t)) is
“unappealing” because it is “counterintuitive that people would raise their rates of
time preference as their levels of consumption rise.” Likewise, Blanchard and Fischer
(1989:72—75) contend that Uzawa’s rate of time preference function is “not particu-
larly attractive as a description of preferences and is not recommended for general
use” since the assumption ρ3 > 0 is “diﬃcult to defend a priori ; indeed, we usually
think of the rich who are more likely to be patient.” As it goes, these criticisms are
too harsh. Following Epstein (1987a), section 3 of the paper shows that what matters
for the proper interpretation of the curvature of ρ(u) or ρ˜(c) is not only the level of
consumption at time t but the path of consumption for all times subsequent to t. In
the case where the growth in consumption increases, the tendency toward consump-
tion smoothing, given convex preferences over u(c), implies that more weight is given
to present consumption. The same holds for globally constant consumption profiles
with a path for consumption that is now everywhere higher. The result is intuitive
and this is all that is meant by ρ3 > 0 in this case. In eﬀect, those households who
know they will be ‘more rich’ in the future evaluate current consumption more highly.
7The issue is treated at length in Francis and Kompas (1998). Section 2 below draws on the
results of this paper.
8For example, with ρ constant, it follows that all countries except the most patient one eventually
become credit constrained. See Barro and Sali-i-Martin (1995:103—110) for a general discussion of
the issue.
9Nairay (1984:285) was the first to introduce the restriction given by equation (1.4). For the most
part in this paper, where there is no ambiguity, the condition ρ > 0 will be taken as a representation
implying that both ρ(u) and ρ˜(c) > 0 hold.
10 In fact, in the monetary growth model to follow, none of the reduced-form equations, the sign
of the relevant coeﬃcient matrix for the stability of the steady state, or the comparative dynamics
exercise for variations in θ depend on the sign of ρ(u). See sections 6 and 7 and the appendix
below. Nairay (1984) shows that the assumptions given by (1.3) correspond exactly to the discrete-
time notions of ‘impatience’ and ‘time perspective’ contained in Koopmans, Diamond and Williamson
(1964).
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In addition, section 3 of the paper also shows that an exogenous decrease in the
rate of time preference (where rates of time preference are variable over a given time
horizon), results in larger steady-state values of wealth. A simulation makes this
especially clear and thus confirms a Becker (1980) and Epstein (1987a) result that
varying levels of impatience imply diﬀerent final distributions of wealth and consump-
tion across agents, with, as Blanchard and Fischer (1989:73) might suggest for this
case, the patient being more wealthy in steady state. The result carries over naturally
to the macro model and, indeed, such a plausible outcome in fact requires that ρ3 > 0
holds as a necessary condition.
With sections 2 and 3 in mind, section 4 of the paper returns to the macro economy
and sets out the optimal monetary growth model with variable rates of time prefer-
ence. Section 5 derives conditions for individual optimization. The system is treated
as an explicit two-state variable problem to avoid a transformation error, and in a way
that is nicely applicable to any class of growth models (e.g., models of international
trade and finance and life-cycle studies) which employ a rate of time preference as
an additional state variable. Section 6 constructs the macro-dynamics for a perfect
foresight equilibrium and section 7, finally, illustrates super-nonneutrality. Section 8
concludes. An appendix collects some technical details.
2. Transformation Errors and Rules
Consider a typical intertemporal (life-cycle) problem without money, where any given
path assigns values of consumption c(t) ≥ 0 at each time t ≥ 0 over an infinite
horizon. Let the rate of time preference be a variable that depends on an index of
current and future consumption defined by equation (1.2). For an otherwise standard
utility functional, the problem is to maximize (1.1) subject to
∆˙ = ρ(u(c)) (2.1)
and
w˙(t) = g(w(t), c(t), t) (2.2)
for given initial conditions, ∆(0) = 0 and w(0) = w0. The state variable constraint for
(say) wealth (w), or equation (2.2), is written in general and non-autonomous form.
Equation (2.1) explicitly adds a second state variable, or ∆.
As mentioned, the idea of Uzawa’s (1968:491) transformation is to reduce the
dimension of the problem (to that of a single state variable) by transforming the time
scale from t to ∆, so that the rate of time preference can be treated as a constant and
the usual solution techniques can be applied. To follow this approach, note first that
dt = d∆/ρ(u) from (2.1). With equation (1.1) redefined, the problem now becomes
one of maximizing
J˜(c) =
] ∞
0
u(c(t))
ρ
e−∆d∆ (2.3)
subject to
dw
d∆
=
g(w, c, t)
ρ
(2.4)
and w(0) = w0, a single state variable.
To see the error in Uzawa’s transformation (as applied to non-autonomous sys-
tems) most clearly, consider a specific example. Let preferences be given by u(c(t)) =
5
c
1
2 or c = u2 and let equation (2.1) be represented by
∆˙ = ρ(u(c)) = α+ βu. (2.5)
Define the state variable constraint as
w˙(t) = rw + ν(t)− c = rw + ν(t)− u2 (2.6)
for r a given and exogenous rate of interest. The presence of ν(t) in (2.6) makes the
system non-autonomous.11
Using Uzawa’s transformation, maximize equation (2.3) subject to
dw
d∆
=
1
ρ(rw + ν(t)− u
2) (2.7)
to obtain the following first—order necessary conditions:
1
ρ2

ρe−∆ − ρ3e−∆u− 2ρuλ1(∆)− ρ3λ1(∆)(rw + ν(t)− u2

= 0 (2.8)
dλ1
d∆
=
−λ1r
ρ
. (2.9)
To convert the problem to current—values define φ1(∆) ≡ e∆λ1 and note that
dφ1
d∆
= e∆
dλ1
d∆
+ e∆λ1 = φ1 −
rφ1
ρ
(2.10)
so that transforming the time scale back to t, using d∆ = ρ(u)dt, implies that (2.8)
and (2.9) now become
ρ(1− 2φ1u)− ρ3(u+ φ1(rw + ν(t)− u2)) = 0 (2.11)
and
φ˙1(t) = φ1(ρ(u(c))− r). (2.12)
As a means of comparison, write (2.11) as a single second-order diﬀerential equation.
Using (2.12), (2.5) and (2.6) and diﬀerentiating twice with respect to time gives
2 [u¨+ (α+ βu− 2r)u˙− r(α+ βu− r)u]+

1
ρ
{(ρ− r)βν˙ + βν¨}− β
2ν˙u˙
ρ2

= 0. (2.13)
Now rewrite the problem explicitly in terms of two state variables, without Uzawa’s
transformation. Maximizing (1.1) subject to initial conditions and (2.5) and (2.6)
gives
e−∆ − 2uλ1 + λ2ρ3 = 0 (2.14)
11 In a monetary growth model with variable rates of time preference (as in Section 6 below), the
value of ν(t) is represented by flow additions to the stock of real money balances (m), or θm, for θ
the proportional rate of growth of the nominal supply of money. Net changes in real money balances
or (θ − π)m, for π(t) the rate of inflation, imply that the transition equation is non-autonomous.
Uzawa’s transformation can thus not be used. In models of international trade and finance, ν(t)
would stand for anticipated shocks, imported foreign goods or bond holdings. See Obstfeld (1982)
and Engel and Kletzer (1989) for example.
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λ˙1(t) = −λ1r (2.15)
λ˙2 = ue−∆ (2.16)
∆˙(t) = α+ βu (2.17)
and
w˙(t) = rw + ν(t)− u2. (2.18)
To eliminate the exponential, convert to current-value variables for φ1(t) ≡ e∆λ1(t)
and φ2(t) ≡ e∆λ2(t). Since φ˙1(t) = e∆λ˙1(t) + ρφ1 and φ˙2(t) = e∆λ˙2(t) + ρφ2, first-
order conditions now become
1− 2φ1u+ φ2ρ3 = 0 (2.19)
φ˙1(t) = φ1(ρ(u(c))− r) (2.20)
and
φ˙2(t) = ρφ2 + u. (2.21)
Finally, diﬀerentiating (2.19) twice with respect to time, substituting from (2.5), (2.20)
and (2.21), gives
u¨+ (α+ βu− 2r)u˙− r(α+ βu− r)u = 0 (2.22)
or the system as described (again) by a comparable single, second—order diﬀerential
equation in u.
Comparing equations (2.13) and (2.22) makes the point. The two are equivalent
only when ν˙(t) = ν¨(t) = 0.12 In other words, Uzawa’s transformation is valid only
when the problem is autonomous. When this condition does not hold, Uzawa’s trans-
formation generates errors in first-order conditions and resulting optimal paths. In
eﬀect, the transformation ignores the non-linearities caused by the explicit presence
of time as a variable in the transition equation.
3. Variable Rates of Time Preference and Simulation Results
Consider again the life-cycle problem of maximizing (1.1) subject to (2.1) and the
state-variable constraint
w˙ = rw − c (3.1)
for ∆(0) = 0 and w(0) = w0.13 From first-order conditions, the equation of motion
for consumption is given by
c˙ =
uc(ρ− ρ3u)[(r − ρ)− ρ3uc(rw − c)]
ρ33u2c(rw − c)− ucc(ρ− ρ3u)
(3.2)
12 It can be easily shown that this condition, as expected, amounts to a system where dH/dt = 0,
for H the value of the relevant Hamiltonian. Since the problem is clearly autonomous, such a system
can thus be properly transformed using Uzawa’s technique. See Francis and Kompas (1998).
13See Nairay (1984), Obstfeld (1990) and for a full analysis of this problem, especially Kompas and
Preston (1998). Uzawa’s transformation is applicable in this case (see Francis and Kompas (1998)
for the relevant proof). Note, too, that for ρ = ρ¯ in equation (3.2) below that the standard result is
obtained, or c˙ = (uc/ucc)(ρ− r).
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and in steady-state rw = c and ρ[u(c)] = r. A linear approximation to the steady
state implies that

c˙
w˙

=

0 ρ3uc/A
−1 r

c− c∗
w −w∗

(3.3)
for
A = ucc/uc − ρ33ucu/(ρ− ρ3u) < 0 (3.4)
with the determinant of the above matrix given by |D| = ρ3uc/A < 0, indicating a
saddlepoint.
Given the value of |D|, restricting ρ3 to be greater than zero is clearly necessary for
saddlepoint stability (the steady state is locally unstable if ρ3 < 0). But, as mentioned
in the introduction above, this does not necessarily imply that the functional form ρ =
ρ(u(c(t)) and the variation ρ3 > 0 is “unappealing”. In particular, it does not imply
that the rate of time preference depends only on the level of current consumption. It
also depends on the path of consumption for all periods subsequent to t. For a given
household, in other words, the condition ρ3 > 0 implies that an increase in the path of
c(t), formally, a Volterra derivative, results in an increase in the current rate of time
preference. A greater weight is thus placed on present consumption, and in a way
fully consistent with convex preferences (or the desire for consumption smoothing).
To get a picture of all of this, consider first the marginal rate of substitution as
defined in terms of variations in the value function J(c) in equation (1.1). Following
Ryder and Heal (1973), let c∗ be the reference path and c(t) = c∗(t) + µ(t)∆c the
variational path, and define the value of forward consumption from T , or T c(t) as
J(T c(t)) =
] ∞
T
u(c(t)) exp

−
] t
T
ρ(u(c(τ))dτ

dt. (3.5)
For an arbitrary period of time, ∆ε, and using the definition of ∆ in equation (1.2)
so that
∆(0, T −∆ε) =
] T−∆ε
0
ρ(u(c(t))dτ (3.6)
defined (for example) over a specific time interval (0, T −∆ε), the value of the varia-
tional path is given by
J(c(t)) =
] T−∆ε
0
u(c(t))∆(0, t)dt+∆(0, T −∆ε)J(T−∆εc(t)) (3.7)
and comparing this to a comparable expression for c∗(t) implies that
J(c∗(t))− J(c(t)) = ∆(0, T −∆ε)[J(T−∆εc∗(t))− J(T−∆εc(t))]. (3.8)
A Volterra derivative is defined when ∆ε and ∆c → 0. Now consider another varia-
tional path c∗∗ which diﬀers from c(t) over two distinct intervals (τ1 −∆ε, τ1) and
(τ2 −∆ε, τ2). Replace c∗∗ with c∗, repeat equations (3.7) and (3.8) and let the total
change in the value function be zero. In the limit, the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption at dates τ1and τ2 is
χ(c; τ1,τ2) ≡
J 3(c; τ1)
J 3(c; τ2)
(3.9)
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and truncating the original consumption path in equations (1.1) and (1.2) above, as
in (3.5), while taking the time derivative of J(c(t)), obtains
ρ(t) =

∂∆(τ1,τ2)
∂τ2

(3.10)
when τ1 = τ2. Equations (3.7)—(3.10) make it clear that both the marginal rate of
substitution and the rate of time preference depend on the entire path of consumption.
In fact, for a truncated path through consumption at T , the functions χ(c(T ), J(T c))
and ρ(c(T ), J(T c)), separating current from future consumption, clearly depend both
on the value of consumption at time T along this path, and the utility gained from
the consumption path for all times subsequent to T .14 It follows that the variation
ρ3 > 0 simply measures a path eﬀect, applying to changes in both current and future
consumption. An increase in the path of consumption (or with globally constant
consumption profiles, a path that is now everywhere higher in the future), thus implies
an increase in ρ(T ), so that current consumption is given more weight.15
This last result can be seen in a slightly diﬀerent way. As Epstein (1987a) shows,
the general value of ρ(c(T ), J(T c)) obtained from equation (1.1), and comparable to
(3.10), is
ρ(c,ϕ) = u(c)ρ
3(c)− ρ(c)uc(c)
ϕρ3(c)− uc(c)
(3.11)
for ϕ ≡ J(tc), the utility from the path of consumption for times subsequent to t.
The variation in ρ from a change in this path is
ρϕ(c,ϕ) =
ρ3(c)
uc − u(c)ρ3(c)/ρ(c)
(3.12)
for ρϕ ≡ ∂ρ/∂ϕ. Given the restrictions in (1.3) above, the denominator of this
expression is clearly positive, so that, truncating at T, if the value ρϕ(c(T ),ϕ) > 0,
then, by equation (3.12), it must be the case that ρ3(c(T )) > 0. As above (see
equations (3.7)—(3.10)), if there is an increase in the path passing through c(T ), and
for all times subsequent to T, and this results in an increase in ρ(J(T c)), it must imply
that ρ(c(T )) increases.
The only final point to note is that given such a path eﬀect the value ρϕ(c(T ),ϕ) >
0, and the resulting increase in the rate of time preference at T, is consistent with
a tendency for consumption smoothing, or convex preferences. With a logarithmic
change in marginal utility, it is easily seen that
− d
dT
log J(T c) = ρ(c(T ), J(T c))−
ucc
uc
c˙ (3.13)
14See equation (3.7) as ∆ε→ 0 and Kompas (1999) for a complete exposition and relevant proofs.
15Along the lines of Uzawa (1991), Kompas (1999) also analyzes a system where intertemporal
preferences are homothetic so that if a path c(t) R c˜(t), it follows that αc(t) R αc˜(t) for any given
scalar α > 0. For such a preference ordering, χ in equation (3.9) remains unchanged and hence the
rate of time preference does not change when any given consumption path is multiplied by α > 0.
The function ρ simply depends on the growth in consumption. This assumption, however, is not
applicable to the monetary growth model developed below since, in its classical form, all paths are
restricted to be piece-wise continuous. In such a case, a change in θ results in a ‘jump’ in prices
and real money balances at t = 0 and the resulting path eﬀect on real money balances must imply
a comparable ‘impact eﬀect’ on the rate of time preference at t = 0. In short, the rate of time
preference must also depend on the current level of real money balances and not just its growth
(or path) through time. In a macro model with ‘everywhere smooth’ price-paths, the assumption of
homothetic (intertemporal) preferences would thus imply that the controversy over the sign of ρ at
t = 0 could be ignored altogether.
9
so that with uc > 0 and ucc < 0, a c˙ > 0, or any increase in the growth of con-
sumption, thus increases the current rate of time preference. For the case of constant
consumption profiles, equation (3.13) reduces to the more familiar
ρ(c(T ), J(T c)) = r (3.14)
for r a given rate of return. The diﬀerence, of course, between (3.14) and the standard
additive model is that ρ is now a variable that depends the path of present and
future consumption. If ρϕ(c(T ),ϕ) > 0, for ϕ ≡ J(T c), an increase in a globally
constant consumption path implies, from equation (3.12), once again, that ρ(c(T ))
increases, with a new equilibrium (depending on the context) that corresponds to a
larger value of r.16 As long as the argument runs in terms of consumption paths that
are everywhere higher (or lower), whether constant or not, everything follows. The
restriction ρ3 > 0 simply means that if a household knows that it will be ‘more rich’
in the future, it evaluates consumption today more highly.
Finally, consider a comparative dynamics exercise. As mentioned in the introduc-
tion, the idea is to show that when ρ3 > 0 a parametric fall in ρ is fully consistent
with an increase in steady-state wealth.17 To make the analysis especially clear let
the rate of time preference function (for now) be aﬃne18
ρ = κu+ β (3.15)
for κ and β given constants, so that in steady state the following hold
ρ(u(c)) = κu+ β = r
rw = c (3.16)
βuc = ψ[κu(c) + β] (3.17)
for ψ the co-state variable on wealth. Given a change in κ, the relevant variational
system is


κuc 0 0
1 −r 0
A 0 −ρ




dc∗/dκ
dw∗/dκ
dψ∗/dκ

 =


−u(c)
0
ψu(c)

 (3.18)
for A = βucc − ψκuc < 0, with a determinant value |D| = κucrρ > 0. Solving (note
that κ > 0 is necessary for stability) gives
dc∗
dκ
=
−uρr
|D| < 0 (3.19)
16 In fact, this is exactly the reverse case of what occurs in the macro model developed below.
See equations (5.10), (7.7) and (7.8). Here, an increase in θ results in a steady-state fall in the
rate of return (r) and since the path for real money balances (m(t)) and utility, or u(c(t),m(t)), is
everywhere lower, the rate of time preference also falls in steady-state equilibrium.
17This will be particularly relevant in the macro model contained in sections 4—7 below where, in
this case, an induced fall in ρ, given an increase in inflation, results in capital accumulation. The
simulation result also applies to a model which forms a comparison across households (or countries)
with varying rates of time preference.
18See Kompas and Preston (1998) for additional (technical) derivations and a comparative dy-
namics exercise in the sense of Oniki (1973). Nairay (1984) shows that the strict convexity of ρ(u)
implies that the function is approximately aﬃne in u for large values of u. Nonetheless, the point of
contention over the function ρ = ρ(u) usual centers on ρ > 0, which still holds in equation (3.15).
The simulation exercise that follows below is less restrictive in that both ρ and ρ > 0 as in (1.3).
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dw∗
dκ
=
−uρ
|D| < 0 (3.20)
and
dψ∗
dκ
=
−uruccβ
|D| > 0. (3.21)
An decrease in the rate of time preference results in an increase in steady-state wealth
and consumption.
A simulation exercise confirms the result. Set β = 0 (without loss of generality)
and let
ρ = κ
c0
u2 (3.22)
so that both ρ3 and ρ33 > 0, for c0 an arbitrary constant. Let u(c) = c0.75, r = 0.1,
c0 = 100 and w0 = 1000. Begin, at first, with a value of κ = 0.002. (In this numerical
case the problem is bounded in that κ < 0.01.) After calculating the value of A in
equation (3.4), the idea is to form a log-linear approximation around steady-state
values for the system given by (3.3) in order to generate numerical solutions to the
approximate nonlinear system. In so doing, the system now becomes

1 0
0 1

c˙
w˙

+

0 0.08
1 −0.1
 
c
w

=

0.08w∗
c∗ − 0.1w∗

(3.23)
where the general solution contains two roots, γ1 = 0.14 and γ2 = −0.06, consistent
with a saddlepoint. Ignoring the positive root, the general solution is

0 0.08
1 −0.1
 
c
w

=

0.08w∗
c∗ − 0.1w∗

. (3.24)
A similar procedure is performed for values of κ = 0.004 and κ = 0.006 and the results
for steady-state values of wealth (w), years, and speed of converge are summarized
in Table 1.19 Each calculated path can be shown to be increasing and monotone and
that it converges to a higher steady-state value of w∗ in finite time as κ decreases.
κ = 0.002 κ = 0.004 κ = 0.006
Steady-state w∗ 13000 8300 6400
Time-scale of convergence (years) 200 150 110
Speed of convergence 0.06 0.08 0.09
Table 1: Numerical results for w∗ given a change in κ
4. A Simple Monetary Growth Model
The results of Sections 2 and 3 are now applied to a simple monetary growth model.
Detailed assumptions are as set out in Sidrauski (1967b). Individuals are assumed
identical, can hold either money or capital and production is neoclassical (time—
subscripts are often dropped for convenience)
y = y(k); y3 > 0, y33 < 0, y(0) = 0 (4.1)
19For example, for the speed of convergence for κ = 0.002, the value of w(t) = −12000e−0.06t +
1300.
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for y real output per—capita. The instantaneous utility function is defined as u =
u(c(t),m(t)) for c per—capita consumption and m per-capita real money balances,
with uc, um > 0, ucc, umm < 0 and J = uccumm − u2mc > 0. Restricting
J1 = umm − (ucmum)/uc < 0 J2 = (uccum)/uc − ucm < 0 (4.2)
guarantees that both c and m are normal goods.
Money is introduced into the system through net lump-sum transfers where the
individual’s flow constraint is of the form
a˙ = y(k) + v − (δ + g)k − (π + g)m− c (4.3)
for a non—human wealth, v the value of net transfers (or θm in the aggregate economy),
δ and g the exogenous rates of depreciation and population growth and π the rate
of inflation. Unlike Sidrauski, assume ‘myopic perfect foresight’ so that actual and
expected rates of change in the price level are equal.20 The corresponding stock
constraint is
a = k +m (4.4)
for each t in the planning horizon.
Following Uzawa (1968), define ∆(t) to be the utility discount factor at t, where
∆(t) =
] t
0
ρ(u)dτ ∆(0) = 0 (4.5)
for ρ = ρ(u) = ρ[u(c,m)] the individual rate of (subjective) time preference, assumed
now to be a function of c and m and over a given path. As discussed in sections 1
and 3 above, restrict ρ(u) such that
ρ > 0, ρ3 > 0, ρ33 > 0, ρ− ρ3u > 0. (4.6)
The individual’s problem amounts to finding the time—profiles (ct,mt) which maximize
L =
] ∞
0
u(c,m)e−∆(t)dt (4.7)
subject to constraints (4.3) and (4.4), a(0) = a0 and
∆˙(t) = ρ(u) = ρ(u(c,m)). (4.8)
5. Individual Optimization
To avoid a transformation error (see section 2), define the current—value Hamiltonian
as a two—state variable problem, or
Hˆ = u(c,m) + σ[y(a−m) + v − (δ + g)(a−m)− (π + g)m− c] + φρ[u(c,m)] (5.1)
for σ(t) ≡ e∆λ(t) and φ(t) ≡ e∆γ(t), with λ(t) and γ(t) the co—state variables for the
constraints given by equations (4.3) and (4.8). Since
σ˙(t) = e∆λ˙(t) + e∆λ(t)∆˙ = e∆λ˙+ ρφ (5.2)
20As is well-known, ‘myopic perfect foresight’ means that agents can calculate the right—hand time
derivative of p(t) over the entire planning horizon. Following Sargent and Wallace (1973), and given
the ‘classical’ nature of this monetary growth model, p(t) is assumed to be piece—wise continuous,
with a finite number of jumps.
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and
φ˙(t) = e∆γ˙ + ρφ (5.3)
first—order necessary conditions (assuming an interior solution and the appropriate
transversality conditions) are
uc =
σ
1 + φρ3
(5.4)
um =
σ
1 + φρ3
(y3 − δ + π) (5.5)
σ˙ = σ[ρ(u(c,m))− r + g] (5.6)
φ˙ = φρ[u(c,m)] + u(c,m) (5.7)
a˙ = y(a−m) + v − (δ − g)(a−m)− (π + g)m− c (5.8)
for r = y3 − g. Equations (5.4) and (5.5) given the usual static result for utility
maximization, or
um
uc
= y3 − δ + π = r + π (5.9)
and (5.6) implies that
ρ(u(c,m)) = r − g (5.10)
when σ˙ = 0. Note that for the case in which ρ(u) = ρ¯, all the standard first—order
conditions for utility maximization with a constant rate of time preference clearly
return.
6. Perfect Foresight Macro Dynamics
Assume that market equilibrium requires that the supply and demand for money be
equal at each time t. For v = θm, a perfect foresight equilibrium is represented by
a bounded time—profile for prices p(t) and corresponding paths (ct,mt, kt,σt) that
satisfy21
k˙ = y(k)− (δ + g)k − c (6.1)
Asset market (flow) equilibrium now becomes
a˙ = y(k)− (δ + g)k + (θ − π − g)m− c (6.2)
where the change in per capita real money balances with respect to time is given by
m˙ = (θ − π − g)m (6.3)
so that the equilibrium rate of inflation is π∗ = θ − g.
The macro model consists of equations (5.4)—(5.6), (6.1) and (6.3). A linear ap-
proximation to the steady—state values (c∗,m∗, k∗,σ∗) gives


c˙
m˙
k˙
σ˙

 =


A1 A2 A3 −ρ/A4
mJ2/uc −mJ1/uc my33 0
−1 0 ρ 0
σρ3uc σρ3um −σy33 0




c− c∗
m−m∗
k − k∗
σ − σ∗

 (6.4)
21A bounded and strictly positive value for p(t) for all t guarantees (in an otherwise saddlepoint un-
stable system) that the economy always converges to a new steady-state in response to an exogenous
shock. See Sargent and Wallace (1973), Burmeister (1980), and Kompas and Spotton (1989).
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for
A1 = 1/A4[(A5mJ2/uc) + ucc(ρ− ρ3u)− ρ33uu2c]
A2 = 1/A4[(−A5mJ1/uc) + ucm(ρ− ρ3u)− ρ33uucum]
A3 = 1/A4[A5my
33 − σy33]
A4 = σucc/uc + [(σ − uc)/ρ3]ρ33uc
A5 = −[(σucm/uc) + {(σ − uc)/ρ3}ρ33um]
where the determinant of the above coeﬃcient matrix is negative, indicating a sad-
dlepoint.22
7. The Eﬀect of a Change in θ
Super—nonneutrality can finally be illustrated. For steady—state values, the following
hold
ρuc − ρ3uuc = σ(r − g) (7.1)
um
uc
− θ = r − g (7.2)
y(k)− (δ + g)k = c (7.3)
ρ(u(c,m)) = r − g (7.4)
and comparative steady states gives


A6 A7 σy33 −ρ
J2 −J1/uc y33 0
−1 0 ρ 0
ρ3uc ρ3um −y33 0




dc∗/dθ
dm∗/dθ
dk∗/dθ
dσ∗/dθ

 =


0
−1
0
0

 (7.5)
for
A6 = ucc(ρ− ρ3u)− ρ33uu2c
A7 = ucm(ρ− ρ3u)− ρ33uucum.
The determinant of the above matrix is
|D| = ρ[(J1y33/uc)− ρ3umy33 − ρ{(ρ3J2um/uc) + ρ3J1}] > 0 (7.6)
and solving gives
dm∗
dθ
=
ρ(y33 − ρρ3uc)
|D| < 0 (7.7)
dk∗
dθ
=
ρρ3um
|D| > 0 (7.8)
An increase in θ decreases steady-state per capita real money balances (just as in
the super-neutral case), but increases both the steady-state capital-labour ratio and
consumption per capita.23
The intuition for this eﬀect is generally the same as that contained in ‘descriptive’
monetary growth models, except that the rate of time preference, or more to the point,
22See the Appendix below.
23Note that for ρ = ρ¯, dc∗/dθ and dk∗/dθ equal zero, as usual.
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changes in the rate of time preference drive the super-nonneutral result. Moreover,
both the ‘impact’ and steady-state eﬀects are fully consistent with the comparative
dynamics exercise (given change in the rate of time preference) described at the end
section 3 above. An increase in θ lowers the rate of return on holding money balances
as π increases. With perfect foresight and ρ3 > 0, the fall in the path ofm(t) decreases
utility and hence the rate of time preference at a given k(0). With the resulting fall
in ρ, individuals are thus induced to accumulate or hold larger steady-state stocks of
capital, with a higher nominal rate of return (r + π) partially oﬀsetting the increase
in π. With an increase in k the value of consumption (and thus ρ) also rises, but since
real returns fall in steady-state (y33(k) < 0), the steady-state rate of time preference,
from equation (7.4), must still be lower than at t = 0.24 In short, real and nominal
returns move in opposite directions and a smaller value of ρ corresponds to a larger
equilibrium value for k.
8. Conclusion
This paper has constructed a simple optimal monetary growth model where changes
in the proportional rate of growth of the money supply aﬀect both the rate of time
preference and the equilibrium capital-labour ratio. A Tobin-eﬀect is restored in a
system where otherwise strong neoclassical assumptions (e.g., perfect foresight, an
infinite planning horizon, and continuous market-clearing) are maintained. With a
change in θ, increases in the rate of inflation result in a fall in the rate of time
preference and induced capital accumulation. The steady-state value of k increases.
In addition, a justification for curvature restrictions on the rate of time preference
function has also been provided. The analysis demonstrates that ρ depends on the
entire path of consumption and that ρ3 > 0 measures a variation in a given path
that is nicely consistent with the desire for consumption smoothing. In eﬀect, ρ3 > 0
implies those households who know they will be ‘more rich’ in the future evaluate
current consumption more highly. A comparative dynamics exercise also shows that,
with ρ3 > 0, a decrease in the rate of time preference must imply a larger steady-state
value of wealth. The eﬀect is fully consistent with the increase in k (from an induced
fall in ρ) obtained in the macro model.
Two further lines of research immediately come to mind. First, it would be helpful
to have a precise specification of the transitional dynamics, detailed at the end of
section 7 above, given by the eﬀect of a change in θ on ρ and k for all time t > 0.
Adapting the work of Fischer (1979) might be particularly helpful in this case since
the constant relative risk aversion utility functions that he uses are known to be
broadly consistent (see Epstein (1983)) with the curvature assumptions on ρ(u) used
in section 3 of this paper. Second, it may now be worthwhile to reconsider models
of international trade and finance using variable rates of time preference, along the
lines of Obstfeld (1981a,1981b). This is important since if the justification for the
curvature of ρ(u) in this paper is correct, such systems can be usefully constructed to
avoid what Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995:108) term the “disturbing implications” of
standard open-economy (Ramsey) models. Unlike Obstfeld, however, the model must
be explicitly written as a multi-state variable problem in order to avoid the error in
24Although it is clear that the steady-state value of u(c(t),m(t)) and ρ falls with an increase in θ,
the value of u(c(t),m(t)) does not fall as much as in the super-neutral case since, with the fall in the
rate of time preference, an increase in the equilibrium value of k(t) results in higher values of c(t).
See equation (7.3).
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Uzawa’s transformation detailed in section 2 above
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APPENDIX
The equation for c˙ used in system (6.4) is derived from first—order conditions.
Diﬀerentiate (5.9) with respect to time to obtain
uccc˙+ ucmm˙ = σ˙/(1 + φρ3)− σ(φ˙ρ3 + ρ˙3φ)/(1 + φρ3)2 (A1)
where ρ˙3 = ρ33ucc˙+ ρ33umm˙. With equations (5.6) and (5.7),
φ = (σ − uc)/ρ3uc (A2)
so that substituting in (A1) gives
c˙ = 1/A4[A5m˙+ σ(ρ− y3 + δ + g)− ρ(σ − uc)− ρ3uuc] (A3)
as given in Section 6.
The determinant of the coeﬃcient matrix in system (6.4) is
|F | = ρ/A4[(σmJ1y33/uc)− σρ3mumy33 − ρ{(σmρ3umJ2/uc) + σρ3mJ1}]. (A4)
Since J1, J2, y33 < 0 and σ, ρ,ρ3,m, uc, um > 0, the sign of |F | = sign {A4}. At
a steady state φ = −u/ρ, so that uc = σ/(1 − ρ3u/ρ) implying that (σ − uc) in
A4 is negative, indicating a saddlepoint. It can also be shown formally that the
characteristic equation for this system has a unique negative root.
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